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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the historical development of Chilean congressional 
leadership ofﬁces (1834-1924), while testing a proposition of the theory of 
legislative institutionalization that says that legislatures gradually move to-
ward greater boundedness over time. The indicator of boundedness is the 
length of the apprenticeship of congressional leaders. Lateral entry, short 
ofﬁce tenure, and returning leaders became distinctive features in the case 
at hand. Institutional design and exchanges between the legislature and the 
environment determine legislative institutionalization, so a legislature insti-
tutionalizes by acquiring stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustain-
ability in a polity.
 Key words: Legislative institutionalization; boundedness; apprenticeship; legislature. 
RESUMEN
Este artículo analiza el desarrollo histórico de las oﬁcinas de liderazgo par-
lamentario chilenas (1834-1924) y somete a prueba una proposición de la 
teoría de institucionalización legislativa que dice que los congresos gradual-
mente aumentan su delimitación. El indicador de delimitación es la exten-
sión del aprendizaje de los líderes parlamentarios. En el caso en estudio, 
entrada lateral, permanencias cortas y líderes retornados constituyeron ca-
racterísticas distintivas. Diseño institucional e intercambios entre el congreso 
1* Abreviatures: SCD: Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados; SCS: Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores; 
Ord.: Sesión Ordinaria; Ext.: Sesión Extraordinaria; Reglamento (1831): 1831 Reglamento Interior de 
la Cámara de Diputados; Reglamento (1840): 1840 Reglamento del Senado; Reglamento (1846): 1846 
Reglamento Interior de la Cámara de Diputados.
2 Doctor (Ph.D.) y Magíster (M.A.) en Ciencia Política, Universidad Estatal de Nueva York en Albany, 
Estados Unidos de América. Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas, Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de Val-
paraíso, Chile. Correo: iobandoc@utal.cl
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y el ambiente determinan la institucionalización legislativa, por lo que un 
congreso se institucionaliza en virtud de su estabilidad, permanencia, unici-
dad y sustentabilidad.
 Palabras clave: Institucionalización legislativa; delimitación; aprendizaje; congreso.
Introduction
Research on legislative origins explains the creation, permanence, and salience 
of legislatures. This is the goal of the theory of legislative institutionalization, which 
emerged out of a concern with congressional careers and the historical time of the 
American Congress in the late 1960s3.
This theory focuses on the process of legislative development from a historical 
perspective. It takes the whole legislature -or legislative institutions, as a unit of analy-
sis, while conceiving it as an organization that moves toward growing stability, per-
manence, and distinctiveness by increasing boundedness, complexity, and automicity, 
although subjected both to external and internal inﬂuences4 5.
Legislative scholars have researched legislative institutionalization through inten-
sive ﬁeld work in several legislatures, e.g. national, supra-national, and sub-national. 
Besides harsh theoretical controversies, they have measured legislative institutiona-
lization through several operational indicators that tap the dimensions involved the-
rein. In so doing, their ﬁndings make possible to hypothesize about patterns of legisla-
tive development6. 
3 Witmer, Richard, The Aging of the House /in/ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 79, 1964, pp. 526-541; 
Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 144-145.
4 Collie, Melissa, Legislative Structure and its Effects, in Silbey, Joel H. (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Ameri-
can legislative system: studies of the principal structures, processes, and policies of Congress and 
the state legislatures since the colonial era, C. Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1994, pp. 567-571; Polsby, 
Nelson, Studying Congress through Time: A Comment on Joseph Cooper and David Brady, ‘Toward a 
Diachronic Analysis of Congress /in/ American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, no. 4., 1981, p. 1011; 
Hibbing, John, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quar-
terly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, pp. 156-157.
5 Sociological institutionalism accepted reversals of institutionalization due to internal causes.  Peters, B. 
Guy, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’, Pinter, London, 1999, pp. 99-
100.
6 Cf. Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968; Polsby, Nelson, Gallagher, Miriam, and Rundquist, 
Barry Spencer, The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives /in/ Ameri-
can Political Science Review, Vol. 63, no. 3, 1969; Chaffey, Douglas, The Institutionalization of State 
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The Chilean legislature, on the other hand, has been around for more than a 
one-and-a-half century, despite some interruptions (e.g., 1838, 1924-1925, 1932, 
1973-1989). The reemergence of this legislature attests the meaningful role it plays 
in the Chilean polity. Indeed, this role did not go unnoticed for an early visitor to the 
country, Paul S. Reinsch, who critically underscored the vitality of the early Chilean 
legislature (1834-1924), as follows:  “The public life of Chile offers a most fascinating 
ﬁeld to the student of political science, because here he will encounter conditions of 
society and political action not unlike of those of the most interesting periods of politi-
cal history … With the England of the eighteenth century Chile has much in common. 
Here, too, an aristocracy of birth and wealth has unquestioned control of social and 
political life. … The Chilian (SIC) parliament is the council of a governing class where 
men who, with all their differences of opinion, respect each other, meet and discuss 
their common interests with dignity and ability. Here it is possible for the investigator 
to observe a community engaged in almost purely political controversy, a communi-
ty in which political discussion always hold the center of the stage. … The very ﬁst 
impression of which the study of Chilian (SIC) political history conveys is that of the 
stability of Chilian (SIC) society7”.
Interestingly enough, congressional institutions –both structures and routines, re-
emerged without departing sharply from previous times, as inferred from both houses´ 
standing orders and some observations about the Chilean legislature8. The latter stron-
gly suggests that the Chilean legislature gradually institutionalized by achieving stabi-
lity, permanence, and distinctiveness among Chile´s political institutions -especially 
by the early twentieth century9, which advices focusing on those early years in which 
Chilean congressional institutions acquired their features, as they hold the key to un-
derstand their historical development. 
Legislatures: A Comparative Study /in/ The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1970; Cooper, 
Joseph and Brady, David, Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress /in/ The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 75, no. 4, 1981; Hibbing, John, Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the 
British House of Commons /in/ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, no. 3, 1988; Hibbing, 
John and Patterson, Samuel,  The Emergence of Democratic Parliaments in Eastern and Central Europe 
in Copeland, Gary and Patterson, Samuel (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World, The University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994; Judge, David, Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Ar-
row? /in/ Government and Opposition, Vol. 38, no. 4, 2003.
7 Reinsch, Paul, Parliamentary Government in Chile /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 3, 
no. 4, 1909, pp. 507-510.
8 Stokes, William, Parliamentary Government in Latin America /in/ The American Political Science Re-
view, Vol. 39, no. 3, 1945, pp. 526-527; Gil, Federic, The Political System of Chile, Boston: Houghton 
Mifﬂin Company, Boston, 1966, pp. 117-119; Valenzuela, Arturo and Wilde, Alexander, Presidential 
Politics and the Decline of the Chilean Congress, in Smith, Joel and Musolf, Lloyd (eds.), Legislatures 
and Political Development, Duke University Press, Durham, 1979, pp. 192-195
9 Obando Camino, Iván Mauricio, Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924, unpublished man-
uscript, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, 2009, p. 405.
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Focusing on the apprenticeship of congressional leaders of the early Chilean 
egislature (1834-1924), i.e. both houses´ Presidents and Vice-Presidents, from the van-
tage point of the theory of legislative institutionalization, provides an opportunity to 
ﬁnd out about the historical development of Chilean congressional leadership ofﬁces 
in a milieu characterized both by internal and external inﬂuences, e.g. institutional 
design and growing impact of partisanship, precisely at a time in which most Chilean 
congressional institutions acquired their long-term features. Likewise, it makes possi-
ble to test a key proposition of this theory that takes aim at differentiating the legisla-
ture from its environment. i.e., legislatures move toward greater boundedness by har-
dening their external boundaries, as evinced by the emergence of career opportunities 
available to Congress members only. On this vein, the length of the apprenticeship 
of congressional leaders is a classical, operational indicator of boundedness drawn 
from Polsby´s “The Institutionalization of the US. House of Representatives”, publis-
hed in 1968, which assumes that congressional leadership ofﬁces are unavailable to 
members lacking some congressional experience, so recruitment to these ofﬁces takes 
place from within the legislature -as opposed to lateral entries from without10. Sum-
ming up, this research pursues to ﬁnd out about the historical development of Chilean 
congressional leadership ofﬁces, while contributing to theory-building by testing that 
proposition in a non-traditional legislature at the same time.
This article describes a pattern of historical development of Chilean congressio-
nal leadership ofﬁces, according to which lawmakers conceived them as majority-
controlled ofﬁces both inserted in a decentralized power structure and subjected 
to external inﬂuences that made their way through their institutional design. Lateral 
entry, short ofﬁce tenure, and returning leaders became conspicuous features of these 
ofﬁces; however, liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative Republic had a diverse 
impact on both houses´ leadership ofﬁces by rising to mild prominence the House 
Presidency, while decreasing the prominence of the Senate Presidency, even though it 
did not change their main features in the long-run.
By the same token, it shows that the aforementioned proposition receives mixed 
support from the evidence analyzed herein. The latter implies that legislative insti-
tutionalization takes different conﬁgurations depending on the institutional design 
and the exchanges between the legislature and the environment (especially the party 
system), all of which determine an upper limit for the institutionalization of a legisla-
ture11. Therefore, the characteristics, and operational indicators to measure legislative 
institutionalization vary in different polities and legislatures, which do not impair the 
10 Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 146, 148.
11 Hibbing, John, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quar-
terly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, p. 161.
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grounds to consider a legislature as institutionalized, as long as it acquires stability, 
permanence, distinctiveness, and sustainability in a polity.
This article consists of ﬁve sections, including this Introduction and Conclusions. 
It reviews the theoretical issues of the theory of legislative institutionalization at ﬁrst. 
It focuses on the constitutional framework of the early Chilean legislature and the 
structural aspects of the congressional leadership ofﬁces thereafter. Finally, it analyzes 
the length of apprenticeship of both houses´ congressional leaders.
The theory of legislative institutionalization
Sociological institutionalism provided the background for the theory of legisla-
tive institutionalization, as leading scholars developed an interest in the role of insti-
tutions and the process of institution-formation, e.g. Parsons, Selznick, and Eisenstadt. 
Eisenstadt deﬁned institutionalization as “a process of continuous crystallization 
of different types of norms, organizations, and frameworks which regulate the proces-
ses of exchange of different commodities12”. This deﬁnition implied both continuity 
and change in social norms and structures, because institutionalization meant esta-
blishing effective system boundaries, which made room for challenging groups13.
Legislative scholars did not pay heed to this inference, though. They suggested 
instead that legislative institutionalization implied stability and permanence of 
legislative structures through process-oriented deﬁnitions. Thus, Loewenberg and 
Patterson deﬁned it as “the process by which legislatures acquire a deﬁnite way of 
performing their functions that set them apart14”. Hibbing deﬁned it as “the process 
by which a body acquires a deﬁnite way of performing its functions –a way that sets 
it apart from its environment and that is independent of the membership and issues 
of the moment15”. On the contrary, Sisson made room for change by deﬁning it as 
“the existence and persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior 
12 Eisenstadt, Shmuel, Social Institutions, in Sills, David (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences, Vol. 14, The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 414.
13 Eisenstadt, S. N. Institutionalization and Change /in/ American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, no. 2, 
1964, pp. 235-236, 245-247; Peters, Guy, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institution-
alism’, Pinter, London, 1999, pp. 99-100. On this vein, Eisenstadt maintained that: “Such institutional-
ization is, of course, not random or purely accidental; but neither is it ﬁxed or unchanging” (Eisenstadt, 
Shmuel, Social Institutions, in Sills, David (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 
14, The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 414-415).
14 Loewenberg, Gerhard and Patterson, Samuel, Comparing Legislatures: An Analytic Study, Little, Brown, 
and Company, Boston, 1979, p. 21.
15 Hibbing, John, Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons /in/ 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, no. 3, 1988, p. 682.
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which enable the accommodation of new conﬁgurations of political claimants and/or 
demands within a given organization16”.
Regarding institutionalization and change, Jepperson held later that institutio-
nalization is the process by which a social order or pattern attains a self-reproductive 
nature, which persistence depends upon internal, routine-like procedures; in other 
words, institutionalization is a property of a social order, which counters departures 
from routinized forms, although it does not ensure its survival17. The end-result is a 
process-oriented view of legislative institutionalization that allows legislative structu-
res and routines gradually achieve stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustai-
nability in a polity; namely, legislative institutionalization deals with process instead 
of outcome18. 
Political science took stock of sociological institutionalism through comparative 
politics at ﬁrst. Huntington’s “Political Development and Political Decay”, published 
in 1965, deﬁned institutions as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” and 
institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire 
value and stability”19. Huntington maintained that institutionalization strengthened 
both organizations and procedures, and characterized them by their adaptability, 
complexity, autonomy, and coherence. The latter enabled an organization to set itself 
apart from the environment by establishing boundaries, deﬁning folkways, setting up 
internal procedures, and mediating inter-system exchanges according to an agreed-
upon view. Nevertheless, Huntington did not provide standards to identify and mea-
sure these criteria20.
Drawing from Huntington, Polsby´s “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House 
of Representatives” applied institutionalization theory to the House of Representati-
ves. Polsby deﬁned neither institution nor institutionalization; instead, he focused on 
patterns of legislative behavior that characterized an institutionalized legislature, as 
follows: 1. It distinguishes itself to a high degree from the environment, that is, boun-
dedness. 2. It exhibits a division and interaction of specialized functions that makes it 
16 Sisson, Richard, Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Exploration in Kornberg, Al-
lan (ed.), Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1974, p. 24.
17 Jepperson, Ronald, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism in Powell, Walter and DiMag-
gio, Paul (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1991, pp. 145-149.
18 Peters, Guy, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’, Pinter, London, 1999, 
p. 85.
19 Huntington, Samuel, Political Development and Political Decay /in/ World Politics, Vol. 17, no. 3, 
1965, p. 394.
20 Ibid, pp. 393-394, 411.
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relatively complex, that is, internal complexity. 3. It relies on universalistic and auto-
mated decision-making to perform legislative functions, that is, automicity21.
Polsby measured boundedness through indicators that dealt with careers oppor-
tunities in the House. Indeed, he measured the specialization of the congressional 
leadership through the length of the apprenticeship required to rise to these ofﬁces. 
The rationale for this indicator was that sudden emergence and rise of lawmakers to 
congressional leadership ofﬁces -even from without, characterizes undifferentiated, 
deinstitutionalized legislatures, while the reverse is true for differentiated, institutio-
nalized legislatures. As a matter of fact, Polsby maintained: “As an organization insti-
tutionalizes … Its leadership professionalizes and persists. Recruitment to leadership is 
more likely to occur from within, and the apprenticeship lengthens. Thus the organi-
zation establishes and hardens its ‘outer’ boundaries”22.
The evidence persuaded Polsby that the House exhibited a trend toward grea-
ter institutionalization characterized by a convergence of most indicators from 1890 
through 1910, which he called the “big-bang” period23.
Needless to say, students of American legislatures contested Polsby´s characteris-
tics and indicators of an institutionalized House. These criticisms dealt with the mea-
surement of boundedness, the link between professionalization and institutionaliza-
tion, and the extent of the directionality and change implied in the institutionalization 
process24. However, several of these criticisms seemed to have either supplemented 
the theory or brought about a more attentive focus on some aspects of legislatures in 
retrospective25.
21 Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 145, 168; Polsby, Nelson, “Legislatures”, in Greenstein, Fred 
I. and Polsby, Nelson (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 5, Addison-Wesley Publishing Com-
pany, Reading, 1975, p. 289.
22 Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 145-146.
23 Polsby´s conclusions received additional weight from a follow-up study on the growth of seniority in 
the House (Polsby, Nelson, Gallagher, Miriam, and Rundquist, Barry Spencer, The Growth of the Senior-
ity System in the U. S. House of Representatives /in/ American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, no. 3, 
1969, p. 807). 
24 Dometrius, Nelson and Sigelman, Lee, Costs, Beneﬁts, and Careers in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives: A Developmental Approach /in/ Congress and the Presidency, Vol. 18, no. 1, 1991, p. 63; Fiorina, 
Morris, Rohde, David, and Wissel, Peter, Historical Change in House Turnover, in Ornstein, Norman 
(ed.), Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975, pp. 27-29; 
Chaffey, Douglas, The Institutionalization of State Legislatures: A Comparative Study /in/ The Western 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1970, pp. 182-193; Cooper, Joseph and Brady, David, Toward a Dia-
chronic Analysis of Congress /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, no. 4, 1981, p. 998; 
Hibbing, John R., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, pp. 160-162.
25 Obando Camino, Iván Mauricio, Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924, unpublished man-
uscript, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, 2009, pp. 40-41.
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Interestingly enough, students of legislatures from Western Europe and non-tra-
ditional settings came across with overlooked variables, especially institutional design 
and party systems. On this score, Hibbing maintained that legislative institutionali-
zation assumes an organizational movement in a speciﬁc direction, whose strength 
varies according to the type of legislature26. Hibbing claimed that: “Just as some legis-
latures cannot institutionalize as much as others, legislatures … cannot institutionalize 
as much as more common hierarchical forms27”.
 The early Chilean legislature (1834-1924) and the congres-
sional leadership ofﬁces
 a) The constitutional framework of the early Chilean legislature (1834-1924)
The autocratic Constitution of 1833 presided over the period analyzed here. This 
constitution kept the bicameral legislature created by the 1828 Constitution. It did not 
only bequeath a functioning legislature endowed with legislative, taxing, and budget-
ary authority, but it also provided a constitutional framework for uninterrupted, aris-
tocratic civilian government in Chile, which evolved from an autocratic, aristocratic 
polity to a competitive proto-democracy in a ninety-year time span.
The ﬁrst three presidents elected after 1831 remained in ofﬁce for a decade. They 
inaugurated the autocratic, Conservative Republic that consolidated the nation-state 
and government viability. A new Liberal Republic developed from 1861 to 1891, 
wherein prohibition of presidential reelection in 1871, emergence of modern political 
parties, and congressional policy-making became major staples of this regime. Con-
gressional victory over the presidency in the 1891 Civil War inaugurated the Parlia-
mentary Republic. From 1891 to 1925 Congress shifted the policy-making authority 
to the legislature, while political parties took electoral authority away from the presi-
dency once electoral liberty became ingrained in the Chilean polity.
Throughout this period Congress shared in legislative initiative with the President 
of the Republic, but the latter could restrain the former through extraordinary preroga-
tives that turn him into a republican dictator28. However, the Grand Convention made 
sure that the President of the Republic ruled with the advice of Congress by making 
26 Hibbing, John, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quar-
terly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, pp. 160-162.
27 Ibid, p. 161.
28 Galdames, Luis, Historia de Chile: La Evolución Constitucional, Vol. I. Balcells & Co, Santiago, 1925, 
p. 939; Gil, Federico G., The Political System of Chile, Houghton Mifﬂin Company, Boston, 1966, pp. 
117-119.
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mandatory the annual approval of the investment of public funds, the budget law, the 
authorization of the permanent ground and naval forces, the authorization to station 
permanent troops where Congress was in session and up to two-and-a-half miles, 
and the authorization to impose or suppress taxes every eighteen months. Likewise, 
Congress could impeach cabinet members, generals, admirals, high executive appoin-
tees, and members of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, in case of consti-
tutional or legal transgressions, embezzlement, treason, extortion, and other ethical 
wrongdoings.
b) The President and Vice-President of the each house
Both houses had a leadership that consisted of a President and a Vice-President 
elected by absolute majority. They were re-eligible by the same quorum, though the 
standing orders required a supermajority of two-thirds for their re-election before 
184029. 
To insure a smooth functioning of the House, the House ﬂoor created a Second 
Vice-Presidency in June 1874, after the length of sessions affected the attendance of 
congressional leaders30. 
Although both houses´ standing orders conveyed the idea that they were re-
sourceful congressional leaders, they were political actors that played their part in 
the legislative process among several congressional power wielders, which begot a 
decentralized power structure that constrained them as elected ofﬁcers31. Indeed, 
congressional journals suggest that lawmakers ended up conceiving of the House 
Presidency as a majority-controlled ofﬁce, with which the incumbent joined ranks at 
critical junctures, e.g. House President Montt’s cloture of the debate of the budget in 
188532. 
The term of congressional leaders lasted one month. Later, the contentiousness 
of parliamentary politics turned these monthly contests into votes of no-conﬁdence 
about the incumbent government33. The House passed a reform to elect leaders at the 
inauguration of the ordinary or extraordinary sessions in 1904, as government stabi-
29 Reglamento (1831): Articles 15, 18; Reglamento (1840): Articles 7, 8; Reglamento (1846): Articles 22, 
23; SCS 13 Ord. (7/13/1846): 125-126, 127.
30 Extended sessions impacted on the attendance of leaders. SCD 3 Ord. (6/9/1874): 37; SCD 4 Ord. 
(6/11/1874): 51; SCD 12 Ord. (6/30/1874): 162.
31 Engber Alvarez, Víctor, Los Presidentes de las Cámaras, Universidad de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 
Santiago, 1967, p. 102.
32 Deputy Palma held that the House President had to be an impartial judge. SCD 13 Ord. (7/13/1846): 
126. On the role of House President Montt in 1885, see Encina, 1970: 1,630-1,631.
33 Deputy Palacios recognized it when he proposed to extend the term of House leaders in early 1895. 
SCD 49 Ext. (1/18/1895): 854.
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lity advised to extend the term of leaders. The Senate followed suit in 191734. These 
reforms allegedly strengthened the authority of congressional leaders by giving them 
more independence and opportunities to demonstrate “conditions of impartial justice 
without which there can not be useful work in performing this high position35”.
 c) The restricted role of the Presidency of each house
Presidential authority extended to all businesses required to keep a workable 
legislature, although under several ﬂoor restrictions. Indeed, the only exclusive de-
cision of a President was setting the agenda of secret sessions. Besides, neither Pre-
sidency mattered in the ladder of constitutional ofﬁces. Nevertheless, each President 
participated in the legislative process like any other member, conversely to the British 
Speaker36.
The burden of the ofﬁce drove several Presidents to tender their resignations 
during the nineteenth century, but both houses rejected them most of the time due to 
a lack of alternative37. Indeed, it is a moot point if a good ofﬁce record mattered for 
a nomination to the Executive Ofﬁce, since several Presidents of the Republic held a 
Presidency in the past.
The Presidency and the Vice-Presidency gave their holders a seat in both houses’ 
Committee on Internal Police, which dealt with the congressional staff and internal 
affairs; however, their inﬂuence diminished later when the growth of the membership 
brought about an expansion of this committee membership. These ofﬁces also gave 
their holders a seat in the Committee on the Order of Legislative Business, though 
they did not constitute a majority.
A couple of electoral reforms passed in the early twentieth century provided in-
centives to hold a Presidency. In 1906 Congress mandated that one of the members of 
the Reviewing Committee of Electoral Mandates of Deputies is either an incumbent 
or a former Senate President or Vice-President. In 1914 Congress mandated that two 
of the members of the Reviewing Committee of Electoral Mandates of Senators and 
34 Sánchez, Néstor, El Derecho Escrito y las Prácticas: Estudio sobre el Reglamento Interno de la Cámara 
de Diputados, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, pp. 99-100; Valdés Valdés, 
Ismael, Las Prácticas Parlamentarias: Cámara de Diputados i Senado, Sociedad Imprenta-Litografía Bar-
celona, Santiago, 2nd ed.,1918, pp. 56-57, 205-207, 221-222.
35 Valdés Valdés, Ismael, Las Prácticas Parlamentarias: Cámara de Diputados i Senado, Sociedad Imprenta-
Litografía Barcelona, Santiago, 2nd ed., 1918, p. 57. Deputy Vallejos ﬁled the ﬁrst complaint about an 
arbitrary enforcement of the House Standing Orders on June 13th, 1849. SCD 7 Ord. (6/13/1849): 39.
36 Subsequent reforms did not change the restricted role of the ofﬁce. Reglamento (1846), version of 
1904: Articles 25-30, 97; Reglamento (1840), version of 1921: Articles 11-14, 89. 
37 Senate President Barros Luco unsuccessfully advised his fellow senators not to elect him to the Senate 
Presidency. SCS 65 Ext. (4/27/1896): 631.
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Deputies be either an incumbent or a former President or Vice-President of different 
houses. Nevertheless, these reforms did not require congressional leaders to spend a 
minimal time in ofﬁce before being appointed to these committees.
 The apprenticeship of Chilean congressional leaders, 1834-
1924
 a) Length of the apprenticeship of House leaders
Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide data on the length of apprenticeship of House Pre-
sidents and Vice-Presidents. Considering that some members exited and returned to 
the House at different periods, these tables factor in previous congressional service 
through the sign plus (“+”), e.g. the House President García-Huidobro in 1842.
Table 1 shows an enormous disparity regarding previous congressional servi-
ce among House Presidents, so a long apprenticeship was not a requisite to rise to 
this ofﬁce (See Table 1). The restricted role of the ofﬁce may explain this disparity. 
Likewise, this table shows that a same person could rise more than once to the ofﬁ-
ce. Moreover, this table shows that there were nine House Presidents that lacked an 
immediate record of previous congressional service after 1833 (1840: Montt; 1843: 
Pinto; 1849: Lira; 1852: Urmeneta; 1858: Valenzuela; 1864: Tocornal Grez; 1897: 
Tocornal Tocornal; 1900: Toro; 1906: Orrego González), although three of them had 
it in the past (1864: Tocornal Grez; 1897: Tocornal Tocornal; 1906: Orrego Gonzalez). 
Furthermore, there were ﬁve House Presidents who spent less than a year in Congress 
before being elected to the ofﬁce (1842: Cobo; 1886: Valdés Carrera; 1901: Pinto Iza-
rra; 1909: Bascuñán; 1912: Sánchez). Interestingly enough, this phenomenon diminis-
hed in the Liberal Republic (1864: Tocornal Grez; 1886: Valdés Carrera).
Nevertheless, a minimal congressional service might have been necessary to 
master the ins-and-outs of legislative work. This proposition requires ﬁnding out whe-
ther or not any type of apprenticeship developed eventually, for which purpose it is 
advisable averaging the data of Table 1 by distinguishing the Conservative Republic 
(1833-1891), Liberal Republic (1861-1891), and Parliamentary Republic (1891-1924). 
This exercise provides the following results:
APPOINTMENTS AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1833-1861 26 4,6
1861-1891 27 9,0
1891-1924 43 7,8
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These ﬁgures show that the average apprenticeship of House Presidents went up 
from four years and six months to nine years after 1860. Although it declined to se-
ven years and eight months after 1891, it was still higher than before 1860. The latter 
shows that a mild apprenticeship went hand-in-hand with the liberalization of the 
Conservative Republic after 1861.
According to Tables 2 and 3, a long apprenticeship was not a requisite to rise to 
the First House Vice-Presidency or Second House Vice-Presidency (See Tables 2 and 
3). However, there was a mild apprenticeship to rise to any of these ofﬁces, which is 
apparent after averaging the data of both tables by the aforementioned periods of po-
litical history. Thus, the results for First House Vice-Presidency are, as follows:
APPOINTMENTS AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861 33 3,9
1861-1891 32 5,9
1891-1924 51 4,6
 The results for the Second House Vice-Presidency are, as follows:
APPOINTMENTS AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861 0 0
1861-1891 16 4,0
1891-1924 56 3,5
Although the Second House Vice-Presidency was created in 1874, the average 
apprenticeship required for the House Presidency was always the largest after the 
same period of political history is compared across ofﬁces. Moreover, the length of 
this apprenticeship for both the House Presidency and the First House Vice-Presi-
dency increased during the Liberal Republic and decreased during the Parliamentary 
Republic, though it still remained higher than before 1861. Moreover, the average 
apprenticeship required for the First House Vice-Presidency was larger than the one 
required for the Second House Vice-Presidency, after the same period of political his-
tory is compared between both ofﬁces. Needless to say, the different length of average 
apprenticeship allows inferring the existence of a ranking order among the House lea-
dership ofﬁces.  
However, the reduction of this apprenticeship and the exceedingly high number 
of appointments to each ofﬁce after 1891 is puzzling. Besides the scarce incentives 
provided by these ofﬁces, it might have had something to do with the unstable coali-
tional politics that characterized the Parliamentary Republic, which inﬂuenced elec-
tions to these ofﬁces too. After all, elections to congressional leadership ofﬁces reﬂec-
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ted congressional support for the government38. Unsurprisingly, Rivas commented on 
the election to the House leadership ofﬁces in 1909, as follows: “The radicals asked 
this time the House Presidency for one of them, [they] are the more numerous group; 
they want it for an old and good ﬁghter, Don Francisco de Paula Pleiteado, an honest 
man who never has had honours. The parties granted it upon him. There was [a need] 
to grant upon the democrats, in the person of Malaquías Concha, a vice-presidency to 
represent the union with them in the board39”.
In the end, party considerations, plus mild congressional experience, determined 
who rose to the House Presidency and Vice-Presidencies, albeit the restricted role of 
these ofﬁces might have deterred the most ambitious or experienced members.
38 Edwards Vives, Alberto, Bosquejo Histórico de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos in Edwards Vives, Alberto 
and Frei Montalva, Eduardo, Historia de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos, Editorial del Pacíﬁco S.A., San-
tiago, 1949, p. 134.
39 Rivas Vicuña, Ramón, Historia Política y Parlamentaria de Chile, Vol. 1, Ediciones de la Biblioteca Na-
cional, Santiago, 1964, p. 119.
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 a) Length of the apprenticeship of Senate leaders
Tables 4 and 5 provide data on the length of apprenticeship of Senate Presidents 
and Vice-Presidents. Considering that some members exited and returned to the Se-
nate at different periods, these tables factor in previous congressional service through 
the sign plus (“+”), e.g. the Senate President Pérez in 1873.
Tables 4 and 5 also show an enormous disparity regarding previous congressio-
nal service and that a same person could rise to ofﬁce more than once (See Tables 4 
and 5).
Regarding the Senate Presidency, Table 4 shows that Senate Presidents with short 
previous congressional service were in shorter supply than in the House. Thus, there 
were ﬁve Senate Presidents who did not have an immediate record of congressional 
service (1837: Del Solar; 1867: Tocornal Grez; 1873: Pérez; 1888: Santa María; 1895: 
Reyes Palazuelos), though two of them had it in the past (1873: Pérez; 1895: Reyes 
Palazuelos), including a former President of the Republic (1873: Pérez). Likewise, 
there was one Senate President who did not have previous Senate service, notwiths-
tanding he was a former President of the Republic (Domingo Santa María). By the 
same token, there were two Senate Presidents who spent less than a year in Congress 
before being elected to the ofﬁce (1834: Elizondo; 1852: Lazcano Mujica). However, 
most of these instances split evenly between the Conservative Republic (1834: Elizon-
do; 1837: Del Solar; 1852: Lazcano Mujica) and the Liberal Republic (1867: Tocornal 
Grez; 1873: Pérez; 1888: Santa María), whereas there is only one instance during the 
Parliamentary Republic (1895: Reyes Palazuelos). 
Averaging the data of Tables 4 and 5 by the aforementioned periods of political 
history shed light on the apprenticeship required for the Senate Presidency and the 
Senate Vice-Presidency. Thus, the results for the Senate Presidency are, as follows:
APPOINTMENTS AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861 26 8,2
1861-1891 19 7,2
1891-1924 26 7,1
The results for the Senate Vice-Presidency are, as follows:
APPOINTMENTS AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861 23 5,7
1861-1891 26 5,0
1891-1924 29 5,6
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These results show that the length of the average apprenticeship evolved diffe-
rently for both ofﬁces, even with respect to the House’s. The longest average appren-
ticeship for both ofﬁces occurred during the Conservative Republic. The average 
apprenticeship required for the Senate Presidency decreased constantly over time and 
resembled the House’s by the Parliamentary Republic. This might have had something 
to do with electoral reforms in Senate elections that went into effect in 1876, as part 
of the liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative Republic. The average apprenti-
ceship for the Senate Vice-Presidency remained relatively stable in app. ﬁve years and 
four months, although it increased without a clear-cut explanation during the Parlia-
mentary Republic. These ﬁndings also allow inferring the existence of a ranking order 
between both ofﬁces insofar as the average apprenticeship for the Senate Presidency 
was longer than for the Senate Vice-Presidency. 
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Table 4. Senate President`s previous congressional service
YEAR PRESIDENT SERVICE YEAR PRESIDENT SERVICE YEAR PRESIDENT SERVICE
1834 Benavente 0 1867 Tocornal G. 0 1909 Valdés V. 3,5
Elizondo 0,4 Correa 27,1 Vergara R. 2,0
1835 Tocornal J. 1,1 1868 Covarrubias 1,6 1911 Matte 11,2
1837 Elizondo 2,7 1870 Covarrubias 3,0 1912 Matte 12,0
1837 Del Solar 0 1873 Pérez 0+9,0 1913 Aldunate 4,4
1839 Vial del Río 5,0 1875 Covarrubias 9,0 1914 Ochagavía 2,4
1840 Tocornal J. 6,0 1879 Covarrubias 12,0 1915 Charme 12,0
1841 Yrarrázaval 4,0 1881 Varas 5,1 1918 Tocornal T. 3,0
1843 Yrarrázaval 6,0 1882 Varas 6,0 1919 Lazcano E. 25,3
Vial del Río 9,2 1885 Varas 9,0 1920 Tocornal T. 5,3
Yrarrázaval 6,3 1886 Cuadra 4,1 Claro 8,4
Vial del Río 9,5 1887 Antúnez 2,1 1921 Claro 9,0
1844 Egaña 10,1 Vergara U. 5,4 1924 Yáñez 12,0
Benavente 10,3 1888 Santa María 0
1846 Benavente 12,0 Valderrama 3,5
1847 Yrarrázaval 10,0 1889 Reyes P. 1,0
Pinto 1,1 1891 Silva A. 3,6
Yrarrázaval 10,2 1892 Gandarillas 1,0
Pinto 1,3 1893 Edwards R. 4,7
1849 Benavente 15,0 1894 Edwards R. 5,0
1852 Benavente 18,0 1895 Reyes P. 0+3,0
Lazcano Mujica 0,2 1896 Barros L. 3,7
1855 Benavente 21,0 1897 Lazcano E. 3,0
1857 Mena 8,2 1900 Lazcano E. 6,0
Benavente 23,6 1903 Lazcano E. 9,0
1858 Benavente 24,0 1906 Sanfuentes 2,8
1861 Benavente 27,0 1907 Escobar 4,4
1862 Cerda 4,1 1909 Balmaceda F. 8,0
1864 Larraín M. 9,0 Reyes P. 21,3
Source: Author´s creation from Valencia Avaria, Luis (comp.), Anales de la República, Vol. II.
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 Conclusions
This article pursued to ﬁnd out about the historical development of Chilean con-
gressional leadership ofﬁces, while contributing to theory-building by testing a key 
proposition of the theory of legislative institutionalization in the early Chilean legisla-
ture (1834-1924). This proposition maintains that legislatures gradually move toward 
greater boundedness by hardening their external boundaries, for which purpose the 
apprenticeship of Chilean congressional leaders is an operational indicator thereof 
drawn from mainstream literature. 
The ﬁndings reported herein showed that rising to both houses´ leadership ofﬁ-
ces did not require a long apprenticeship, due to their structural design and the 
growing impact of partisanship. Consequently, lateral entry, short ofﬁce tenure, and 
returning leaders became conspicuous features in the House, though they were in 
shorter supply in the Senate. 
However, a mild apprenticeship to rise to these ofﬁces became apparent after 
averaging the data by the relevant periods of Chilean political history. The avera-
ge apprenticeship was always longer for a Presidency than for a Vice-Presidency in 
each house, even after the creation of the Second House Vice-Presidency in 1874. 
Likewise, the average apprenticeship was always longer for the First House Vice-
Presidency than for the Second House Vice-Presidency. Moreover, the average appren-
ticeship was always longer for a Senate leadership ofﬁce than for any House Vice-
Presidency. All in all, these ﬁndings allowed inferring the existence of a ranking order 
among congressional leadership ofﬁces in both houses. 
Interestingly enough, the average apprenticeship for the House Presidency ended 
up being the longest for all congressional leadership ofﬁces in both houses. In addi-
tion, the average apprenticeship for all House leadership ofﬁces behaved similarly 
over time, because it grew after 1861, notwithstanding a setback after 1891. On the 
contrary, the reverse was true for Senate leadership ofﬁces, as the average apprenti-
ceship for the Senate Presidency and the Senate Vice-Presidency diverged after 1891; 
that is, whereas the Senate Presidency´s constantly decreased after 1834, the Senate 
Vice-Presidency´s went up after 1891. More likely than not, the explanations for the-
se ﬁndings are, as follows: a) Political liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative 
Republic positively impacted on the average apprenticeship for House leadership 
ofﬁces, especially on the House Presidency, which strongly suggests that this ofﬁce 
rose to some extent to prominence after 1861; on the contrary, it impacted negatively 
on the average apprenticeship for the Senate Presidency, which constantly decreased 
over time. b) Decreasing average apprenticeship for the Senate Presidency also might 
have been a life-cycle phenomenon, because former, senior or sophomore House 
members might have run for the Senate Presidency, once inducted into this house.
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No doubt, these ﬁndings described a pattern of historical development of Chi-
lean congressional leadership ofﬁces. First of all, lawmakers did not design them as 
powerful ofﬁces, but as majority-controlled ofﬁces inserted in a decentralized power 
structure, so that external inﬂuences made their way into their institutional design. 
Secondly, lateral entry, short ofﬁce tenure, and returning leaders became conspicuous 
features of both houses´ leadership ofﬁces, partly as a consequence of their institu-
tional design. Thirdly, liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative Republic shaped 
the way these ofﬁces gradually evolved by rising to mild prominence the House Pre-
sidency, while decreasing the prominence of the Senate Presidency, which suggests a 
diverse impact of democratization on both houses´ leadership. Fourthly, liberalization 
did not change the features of both houses´ leadership ofﬁces in the long-run; rather, 
growing partisanship –a by-product of the development of the party system, fueled or 
qualiﬁed some of them during the Parliamentary Republic.
However, the ﬁndings provided mixed support for the theoretical assumption 
tested herein. Indeed, recruitment for congressional leadership ofﬁces came from 
without often; actually, it did not require a long apprenticeship. On the contrary, the 
length of the apprenticeship -as well as the persistence of congressional leadership, 
ebbed and ﬂowed over time, even though it mildly “took-off” in the long-run. Ne-
vertheless, the early Chilean legislature looked institutionalized by the early twentie-
th century40, so the ﬁndings imply that legislative institutionalization takes different 
conﬁgurations depending on the institutional design and the exchanges between the 
legislature and the environment (especially the party system), all of which determine 
an upper limit for the institutionalization of a legislature41. As a matter of fact, the 
evidence showed that boundedness –a characteristic thereof, was in shorter supply 
in the early Chilean legislature than in Polsby´s US. House of Representatives by the 
late 1960s, so the early Chilean legislature scored lower regarding boundedness in a 
hypothetical index of institutionalization. Therefore, the characteristics and operatio-
nal indicators to measure legislative institutionalization vary in different polities and 
legislatures, which do not impair the grounds to consider a legislature as institutiona-
lized, as long as it acquires stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustainability 
in a polity.
40 Obando Camino, Iván Mauricio, Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924, unpublished man-
uscript, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, 2009, p. 405.
41 Hibbing, John, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quar-
terly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, p. 161.
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